The Incoherence of Classical Foundationalism

In "Warranted Christian Belief" Alvin Plantinga sets forth the parameters of classical foundationalism as "believing one proposition on the evidential basis of others." The deontological link to this type of foundationalism requires evidence for the believing Christian in order to justify his basic beliefs.  Rene Descartes presented the foundation for his beliefs upon the certainty of his existence as determined by his ability to doubt that existence.  John Locke proposed the foundation for his beliefs upon his experience.  Here we find the two primary articulations of classical foundationalism as that which presents basic beliefs built upon the foundations of rational thought and sensory experience.  Descartes sought to start over and "rid myself of all the opinions which I formerly accepted, and commence to build anew from the foundation."  One must consider the absurdity of such a claim.  As noble a task as it may seem Descartes was only using his existing opinion(s) to replace and/or increase his basic beliefs.  Locke set forth the elevation of empiricism with his rule that I should "proportion my degree of assent to the probability of the proposition in question."  We find in these two highly influential thinkers the foundational thoughts for classical foundationalism.  

Plantinga and others have pointed out the self-refuting nature of classical foundationalism.  He states, "classical foundationalism appears to be self-referentially incoherent: it lays down a standard for jsutified belief that it doesn't itself meet."  I do believe Plantinga has accurately diagnosed the failure of classical foundationalism and its epistemological presuppositional basis.  As Joseph Wooddell states, "the knowledge claim that for knowledge claims to be valid one must hold the claim based on self-evident, incorrigible, or empirically verifiable propositions is not itself self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses, and it is not grounded on any propositions that are."  In this modernistic approach to philosophical thought we find the use of senses to prove what is supposed to be already basic to the senses.  As Plantinga states, "if the classical picture is true, those who are within their rights in believing (CP) must believe it on the evidential basis of other propositions -- propositions that are properly basic and that evidentially support it." (pg. 95)  The classic foundationalist refutes himself because his statements of what is an evidentially basic belief require dependence upon other basic beliefs, those which he is not willing to admit are basic.

The problem for the modernistic thinker lies in the reliance upon the epistemological question.  There is a fundamental flaw in first asking, "how do we know this?" because it is a question that depends itself to answer itself.  To avoid much confusion and difficulty it is more functionally beneficial to join such premodern thinkers as Augustine who recognized presuppositions are at play in every person's worldview because "before humans can know anything, they must believe something."  Some metaphysical presuppositions are appropriate, which has also been called "expanded foundationalism" and includes properly basic beliefs such as "God exists" and "murder is wrong".  These beliefs begin with what we know about reality although they may or may not be self-evident, incorrigible, or empirically verifiable according to epistemological expectations.  The self-referential incoherence of classical foundationalism is not found in the self-evidential nature of a proposition but in the seeking to prove it is self-evident.  The moment one seeks to prove it is self-evident then one is depending upon rationalism or empiricism to attempt to prove its self-evidential nature.   If something is self-evident, it just is.  It does not require an epistemological basis (how do we know this) but it is a metaphysical (what we know) presupposition and therefore a properly basic belief.  The incoherence of classical foundationalism is the epistemological desire to prove something as self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses.  A broader foundationalism proposes there are certain things that just are...and I don't need to prove they are.